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THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S HUMANE TRAPPING
RESOLUTION ON U.S. WILDLIFE DAMAGE CONTROL PROGRAM
Mahadev Bhat, Robert Gotie and Luther Keller'
University of Tennessee
This paper discusses the implications that
The European Economic Community's recent
Wild Fur Regulation (WFR) might have on
the U.S. wildlife damage control program.
Beginning Jan. 1, 1995, the regulation will
ban fur imports originating from countries
which fail to (1) stop foothold trapping, and
(2) adopt international humane trapping
standards. Countries which pledge to adopt
humane trapping standards will be granted a
one-year extension to comply with the WFR.
Because the European community is an
important market for American furs, the
regulation will affect the trapping of many
American fur-bearing species, including
raccoon, beaver, bobcat, muskrat, coyote,
otter, badger, lynx, marten sable, and ermine.
Compliance send Non-compliance Effects of
WFR
The WFR has become a critical issue for
wildlife agencies since the resolution appears
to be a double-edged knife. Banning foothold
traps in response to WFR has important
implications for the trapping industry,
traditional trappers, forest and agricultural
land owners. Failure to implement this
resolution will also affect them in other
ways.
Most longtime trappers primarily employ
foothold trapping, and by complying with
the resolution, many may be forced to quit
trapping altogether. Already, some states
-such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, and Florida -- have banned such
trapping and observed such an effect. Those
bans resulted in less overall trapping activity
and an increased wildlife population which is
becoming a nuisance. However, because of
the relatively low average fur harvest in
these states, the overall impact of these
foothold trapping bans on fur supplies and
fur species population may not be
significant. Impact of such a ban in states
like New York on fur supply and wildlife
damage could be expected to be large.
On the other hand, failure to implement
humane trapping standards or ban foothold
trapping also will have severe direct and
indirect economic repercussions.
Noncompliance with the WFR will close the
European. fur market to U.S. fur and reduce
fur prices, which in turn will create economic
hardships for trappers, suppliers, dealers, fur
buyers, and a large number of fur industry
employees. Since fur trapping is a seasonal
activity, private trappers who depend on its
marginal income will be affected severely
(Bishop, 1990).
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In the long-run, the WFR has an indirect
impact on property owners. Federal and state
officials consider fur trapping to be an
effective means of regulating wildlife
populations and wildlife damage to
agricultural and forest lands. If WFR-
regulated fur trapping is unprofitable,
trapping activity will decline. In turn, fur-
bearing animal populations will increase --
even in areas where their numbers already
require extreme regulatory management to
avoid overpopulation. The current public
wildlife management program could simply
reduce to nothing more than a pest control
program.
Wildlife Migration, Landowners
Behavior
And Management Implications
The low trapping pressure and the resulting
increased wildlife nuisance activities likely
will leave the responsibility of controlling
their populations and damage to private land
owners. However, the economic
effectiveness of such control efforts by
individual landowners depends on the
population dynamics of wildlife species and
management goals of individual landowners.
Some of furbearer populations are mobile in
nature and have ability to reestablish. For
instance, the experiences from isolated
beaver control efforts have demonstrated that
beavers from neighboring parcels tend to
immigrate continually into less populated
controlled parcels (Houston, 1987).
Nuisance furbearer migration from
uncontrolled to controlled parcels imposes a
migration-related external cost, what is
termed diffusion externality, on the owners of
controlled parcels because they must incur
the future costs of trapping immigrant
populations (Huffaker, Bhat and Lenhart,
1992). The owners incurring trapping costs
have no means to exclude neighbors from
enjoying beaver control benefits. These
problems of non-exclusion, and diffusion
externality are typical features inherent in
most common property resources, and
decrease the cost effectiveness of trapping.
The level of control effort that the owners of
furbearer-affected parcels exercise depends
on which of three management scenarios
they face (Shat 1991; Huffaker, Bhat and
Lenhart, 1992). The owners of neighboring
parcels may have mixed economic
objectives. First, a neighboring parcel may
be public/private land where wildlife
populations are not viewed as a nuisance,
and/or they are protected to provide
recreational opportunities with absolutely no
trapping. Under such circumstances, owners
of wildlife-affected parcels face non-
cooperation from their neighbors, and must
exercise adequate control efforts unilaterally
in the face of the negative diffusion
externality.
Second, all landowners in a given watershed
may consider wildlife as a common 'bad',
and have a similar objective of controlling
the nuisance problem. In this case, all the
landowners need to collectively control the
population over the entire habitat at the same
time, which helps landowners internalize the
diffusion extemality (Bhat, Huffaker and
Lenhart, 1993).
Finally, the adjacent land owners may have
conflicting objectives. The furbearer
populations may have different levels of
damage potentials in the two adjacent
parcels. Considering the example of beavers
again, one of the parcels which is richer in
vegetation may be highly prone to beaver
damage even at a fairly very low level of
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populations. On the other hand, the
neighboring parcel which currently is poor in
vegetation may benefit from a properly
regulated beaver population, through their
ability to create and restore wetland. This
landowner's goal is to maintain relatively
higher stock of beaver population which
might conflict with the interest of the
neighboring landowner as the higher
population pressure on this parcel could lead
to influx of excess beavers to the neighboring
less populated parcel. Even under such
circumstances, there is a scope for
developing a cooperative control program
with careful consideration of each others
management objectives. As often found in
transboundary fishery resources
management, this cooperation could take
place through a process of bargaining and
contracting between landowners as to the
level and time of harvesting by each
landowners.
Concluding Remarks
The WFR is a strong articulation of an
international call for humane trapping and
holds a significant potential for affecting the
future of already suffering U.S. fur trapping
industry and property owners. Now it is time
for wildlife agencies, private landowners,
and the trapping industry to coordinate their
efforts toward public education, trapper
education, and research and to develop
humane trapping methods, lest they lose one
of the fur industry's biggest markets.
Simultaneously, from the property owners
point of view, it is important to understand
the biological behavior of the furbearer
species in order to minimize the
migrationrelated external costs of controlling
their populations. Wildlife agency could play
a major role in educating landowners and
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exploring the possibility of organized,
concurrent trapping efforts among
landowners, capturing both the biological and
economic aspects of wildlife migratory
species.
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